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Abstract: In this article a reference to Jacques Lacan’s ‘capitalist discourse’ will help 
highlight the bio-political workings of neo-liberalism in times of austerity, detecting 
the transition from so-called ‘debt economy’ to an ‘economy of anxiety.’ An ‘il-liberal’ 
turn at the core of neoliberal discourses will be examined in particular, which pivots 
on an ‘astute’ intersecting between outbursts of renunciation; irreducible circularity 
of guilt and satisfaction; persistent attachment to forms of dissipative enjoyment; and 
a pervasive blackmail under the register of all-encompassing regulations and evalua-
tions — all of which elevates the production of success up to the point of a production 
and consumption of failure.
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In his The Making of the Indebted Man, Maurizio Lazzarato (2012b) pro-vided one of the first attempts to inquire into the effects of the creditor and debtor relationship in the wake of the 2008 financial crisis. In his 
view, Michel Foucault’s influential analysis of neo-liberalism offers a crucial ge-
nealogical framework, detecting the transition from classical liberal perspectives, 
which took homo economicus as the subject of exchange and the market, to later 
developments in the Freiburg Ordoliberal School and US neo-liberalism, where 
competition became valorised, and that same subject was then constructed as an 
‘entrepreneur of the self.’ In Foucault’s analysis, neo-liberal practices kept inten-
sifying a crucial principle devised already by German Ordo-liberal theories: “the 
idea that the basic element to be deciphered by economic analysis is not so much 
the individual, or processes and mechanisms, but enterprises” (Foucault 2008, 
225). No longer assumed merely to be labour power, the worker is transformed 
into human capital upon which rests the responsibility to make good or bad 
‘investment’ decisions, which allow for the development, accumulation, valorisa-
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tion of himself or herself as ‘capital,’ increasing or decreasing his or her personal 
capital value. In its later developments, this biopolitical reconceptualisation of the 
individual as an entrepreneur-of-the-self extends to the whole of society, affecting 
all areas of social life, including education and health. Although “enlightening,” 
Lazzarato notices that this account has now become “misleading” in that it is 
unable to account for what occurred from the 1990s on, “when governmentality 
began to limit the freedom which Foucault made the condition of ‘liberalism’” 
(Lazzarato 2012b, 108). According to Lazzarato this becomes particularly prob-
lematic in the light of the recent financial crisis, which has proved that “the mode 
of government founded on business and proprietary individualism has failed. 
By revealing the nature of these power relations, the crisis has led to much more 
‘repressive’ and ‘authoritarian’ forms of control, which no longer bother with the 
rhetoric of the 1980s and 1990s of greater ‘freedom,’ creativity, and wealth” (Laz-
zarato 2012b, 109).
The problem in Foucault’s The Birth of Biopolitics would lie in its strict adher-
ence to the particular vision expressed by German Ordoliberalism, whose objective 
was a de-proletarianisation of the population, aimed at hampering the formation 
of large industrial firms and the subsequent organization of the proletariat into 
an autonomous political force, as had already happened between the nineteenth 
and the twentieth centuries. It is in the light of this de-proletarianisation that 
policies were devised promoting the welfare state and business co-management 
structures that involved workers in the management of capitalist production and 
capitalist society in general. Foucault’s analysis, however, missed the transition 
to a logic of financialised business in the 1970s. Besides allowing for the ensuing 
formation of new professions and the growth of middle classes in what will later 
be called the new-economy, such logic imposed a new ‘government of conduct’ 
based on the new strategic mechanisms of finance, debt, and money—mecha-
nisms whose effective repressive outcomes, we add, could already be observed 
in the modes of control of Third World economies. What the recent crisis has 
unveiled, therefore, is the intensification in the use of these mechanisms result-
ing—in face of post-war projects of de-proletarianisation—in renewed attempts 
of ‘proletarianisation’ through which a generalised economic and existential pre-
cariousness has been instantiated. It is here that the credit and debt relationship 
assumes its full significance, highlighting, for Lazzarato, new subjective types, 
which no longer coincide with both those expressed in the new economy of the 
1980s and 1990s and those described by Foucault: “The promise of what ‘work 
on the self ’ was supposed to bring to ‘labor’ in terms of emancipation (pleasure, 
self-fulfilment, recognition, experimentation with different forms of life, mobility, 
etc.) has been rendered void, transformed into the imperative to take on the risks 
and costs that neither business nor the State are willing to undertake” (Lazzarato 
2012b, 93). In a context of massive cuts on public spending and general wage 
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deflation, “today’s neoliberal policies produce human capital and ‘entrepreneurs 
of the self ’ who are more or less in debt, more or less poor, but in any case always 
precarious” (Lazzarato 2012b, 94).
In this framework, the “working poor” stand out as the new subjective figure 
of a system in which debt and shareholding are proposed as the only alternatives 
to the increasing impoverishment that the reduction of salary and the elimina-
tion of social provisions have produced in the last decade. With declining wages 
and pensions mostly postponed to later age, access to credit and personal share 
portfolios have been proposed as a tool, a form of ‘investment’ in the self, able 
to compensate for changed social and economic conditions. Crucially, the right 
to higher education, housing, forms of social protection and social services has 
been reformulated in the form of benefit, while its very possibility of enjoyment 
is conditional upon the adoption of housing and mortgage credit, student loans, 
and private insurances. According to Lazzarato, the ultimate nexus between pri-
vate debt and sovereign debt that the crisis has exposed in Europe would finally 
reflect the function of debt “as a ‘capture,’ ‘predation’ and ‘extraction’ machine on 
the whole of society, as an instrument for macroeconomic prescription and man-
agement, and as a mechanism for income redistribution.” At the same time, it also 
expresses the role of debt as a “mechanism for the production and ‘government’ 
of collective and individual subjectivities” (Lazzarato 2012b, 29).
This broad picture has been inquired into by the attentive analysis of other 
observers over the last few years, highlighting a new functional role played by what 
has been defined as the debt economy, standing—as Etienne Balibar put it during 
a symposium on debt organised recently by the London Graduate School—“as 
the intensive dimension (not only local but also individualised) of the current 
capitalist form of development whose extensive dimension is globalisation” (Bali-
bar 2013). Some approaches have traced the genealogical background of debt, 
evidencing how the conflation of moral and economic views infusing the idea of 
debt in its anthropological variations in history reverberates in the current form 
of the debt economy (Graeber 2011). In The Debt of the Living, Elettra Stimilli 
(2011) explores the problematic nexus that Foucault first examined between 
Christian pastoral power and governmental and economic power, re-articulating 
Weber’s thesis on the rational ethics of ascetic Protestantism informing modern 
economic life:
My hypothesis is that today—in times when indebtedness has become global, 
standing as an extreme form of compulsive enjoyment—the condition that 
marks the potential nature of action emerges clearly as an ‘indebted being.’ 
Debt, in its various forms, has become the condition for the current modes of 
subjection and, as such, it has to be reproduced rather that satisfied. (Stimilli 
2011, 12)1
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In this perspective, theories of ‘human capital,’ with their related emphasis 
on the capitalisation of work that each one enacts on him/her self, while entail-
ing a form of self-discipline, “a discipline of freedom” as von Hayek put it (1981, 
163),2 requires some sort of renewed asceticism, which renovates the Weberian 
understanding of ascetic posture in regard to capital. “The relation between asceti-
cism and economy, which is central to his [Weber’s] thesis, has to be rethought 
through an analysis able to locate asceticism at the heart of the very ‘conduct of 
life,’ rather than reducing it to a praxis of renunciation aimed at achieving an 
extrinsic end” (Stimilli 2011, 19). We shall see in the next pages the way in which 
this autopoietic, self-styling and circular logic of interest and investment informs 
the ‘astute’ mechanisms of capital through the reproduction of indebtedness and 
the perpetuating lack of a final fulfilment.
Before exploring the modalities of this perpetuum mobile of production, 
consumption and consummation of life in the form of indebtedness, it is useful to 
emphasise some elements of discontinuity that have been identified in regard to 
the current neo-liberal organisation of the credit and debt relationship. We noticed, 
for instance, that rupture is particularly valorised by Lazzarato when he points to 
the limits of Foucault’s analysis in detecting the transition to financial business 
that neo-liberalism was promoting in its 1970s articulations, with the related 
attempt to revive a general process of proletarianisation, also via authoritarian 
means. For Lazzarato, this transition not only entailed the “transformation” of “the 
promise” that was once associated with the neo-liberal “work on the self ” into 
an “imperative to take on the risks and costs that neither business nor the State 
are willing to undertake.” But it also implied an “authoritarian turn” in terms of 
state repressive policies. With this formula, Lazzarato refers to the final abandon-
ment of the “European social model” and the attempt by the state to organise the 
passage from the neo-liberal policies of credit of the 1980s and the 1990s “to the 
new authoritarian and repressive forms of the repayment of debt and the figure 
of the indebted men” (Lazzarato 2012a, 18).3 In this perspective, the so-called 
“German miracle is nothing but a regressive and authoritarian answer to the 
impasses expressed already before 2007” (Lazzarato 2012a, 20), referring to the 
financial difficulties and the blockage of accumulation in the decade preceding 
the eruption of the 2008 crisis. When accompanied by drastic inflexibility towards 
Greece, this reflects the attempt by creditors to see their investments protected, 
but it also reflects the beginning of a “new political phase” in which capital can no 
longer rely on the promise of future wealth for everybody. “To speak with Marx, 
it can only rely on the extension and deepening of ‘absolute plus-value’; that is, a 
stretching of working time, the increase of unpaid work and low wages, cuts on 
public services, the precarity of life and working conditions, and the reduction 
of life expectancy” (Lazzarato 2012a, 20–21).
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We shall remind the reader of how the new discursive emphasis on ‘scarcity’ 
in Europe triggered by austerity has been accompanied in recent years by a criti-
cal convergence of budget deficit and democratic deficit, producing what Etienne 
Balibar has called a “revolution from above” (Balibar 2011). To intervene in budget 
deficit has very often required bypassing democratic procedures. This includes: the 
routinisation of constitutional tools originally intended as a means to deal with 
cases of particular ‘necessity and urgency’ in places such as Italy and Greece; the 
increasing use of confidence votes effectively curbing parliamentary debate; the 
growing dispossession of parliaments’ legislative and oversight prerogatives; and 
successful attempts, in specific cases, to halt popular consultation through votes, 
elections or referenda in countries like Italy, Cyprus or Greece. More generally, 
this has entailed various forms of deprivation with citizens now destitute of, as 
Lazzarato also notices, “the already limited political power granted by representa-
tive democracy, increasing quotas of wealth that past struggles had succeeded in 
tearing from capitalist accumulation, and above all deprived of future; that is of 
time as decision, choice, possibility” (Lazzarato 2012a, 24).
Despite these crucial aspects, the expression “authoritarian turn” still appears 
to be problematic in that it risks over-emphasising differences and ruptures, while 
missing the structural relation that the logic of debt seems to maintain with that 
very discipline of freedom that von Hayek saw as the salient trait of later Ordoliberal 
visions. As Lazzarato puts it:
Debt economy appears to fully realize the mode of government suggested by 
Foucault. To be effective, it must control the social sphere and the popula-
tion—the latter transformed into an indebted population. Such is the essential 
condition for governing the heterogeneity of politics and the economy, but 
within an authoritarian—and no longer ‘liberal’—regime. (2012b, 162; em-
phasis added)
While we agree that the debt economy realises the mode of government that Fou-
cault suggested in his 1978–1979 lectures at Collège de France, a strict separation 
between liberal and authoritarian regimes seems to be highly problematic. We 
would rather replace the term ‘authoritarian’ that Lazzarato expounds with the 
term ‘il-liberal,’ as we think this helps highlight the paradoxical status that the 
idea of freedom covers within the liberal paradigm that Foucault examined. This 
allows us to fully apprehend the way in which that very mode of government that 
Foucault delineated has been indeed realised by the debt economy. This requires, 
however, putting emphasis on the term ‘turn’ as a symptomatic shift allowing for 
a play of symbolic desedimentation, reversal and discursive re-activations, which 
retains elements of continuity. In contrast to what seems to be Lazzarato’s con-
notation of turn as a moment of change and rupture from past practices enacting 
a “new political phase,” we would like to stress the level of structural complexity 
informing this term, highlighting its link to a particular understanding of crisis 
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by Antonio Gramsci in his lengthy reworking of this notion in the aftermath of 
the 1929 Wall Street crash. In one of his 1933 comments on “Past and Present,” 
he warned against the temptation to conceive the crisis as an “event” rather than 
a “complex process” and “unfolding” (svolgimento): “the crisis is nothing but 
the quantitative intensification of certain elements, which are neither new nor 
original—but especially the intensification of certain phenomena—while others, 
which previously appeared and worked together with them, have been immunised, 
becoming inoperative or disappearing altogether” (Gramsci 2001, 1756).4
The il-liberal turn signals here a long and complex process marked by shifts 
in intensity, re-significations, symbolic turnarounds, conjunctural (contingent) 
points. But it also signals—as evidenced by the hyphen in this term—structural 
contiguities between credit and debt, liberal and illiberal practices at the heart 
of that ideal of freedom that Foucault valorised in his analyses of liberalism and 
which Lazzarato considers to be limited by the authoritarian turn of “the current 
crisis,” revealing the “failure of neoliberal governmentality” and a certain “politi-
cal naiveté” of Foucault’s Birth of Biopolitics (Lazzarato 2012b, 108–09). At this 
point, a Lacanian perspective can be introduced, as we believe this can allow for 
a higher level of complexity in the analysis of the political and social workings 
of austerity in the recent crisis.
From the Debt Economy to an Economy of Anxiety
In accounting for the paradoxical dynamics of the il-liberal turn, a useful link 
can be established between the neoliberal logic of self-investment, freedom and 
self-entrepreneurship and Lacan’s “discourse of the capitalist.” In his 1969–1970 
seminar, The Other Side of Psychoanalysis, Lacan formalised four types of 
discourse—the discourse of the master, the university, the analyst and the hys-
terical (Lacan 2006a). For him, this responded respectively to what Freud had 
once qualified as “three impossible professions” (Freud 1964, 248): to educate, 
to psychoanalyse, to govern, with the hysterical, for Lacan, pointing to a fourth, 
unmentioned activity: to elicit desire. These discourses expressed different 
forms of articulating social bonds in a subjective framework organised around 
symbolic castration. Roughly, expressions like paternal Law or symbolic castra-
tion refer to the requirement of a certain drive renunciation that Freud posited 
as conditional for the inclusion of the subject in the programme of civilisation 
and the very establishment of social bonds. The ‘oedipal’ institution of the Law 
in the forms of social and moral norms (but also the very function of language 
in Lacanian psychoanalysis) while ‘limiting’ the subject’s access to enjoyment, 
‘humanises’ and ‘socialises’ the subject through that very request for sacrifice 
and renunciation. Although negative, this prohibition is therefore also productive, 
as it allows the subject to develop ‘desire’ (for instance, the desire to recover the 
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very object that has been lost, sacrificed or forbidden); to give the unconscious 
a certain ontological consistency (e.g., through the symbolic tools of repression 
and the vitality of unconscious desires); and ultimately enabling the subject to 
be part of a wider ‘social’ existence in which monistic enjoyment gives way to a 
desire expressed by social bonds.
During this time, however, Lacan became increasingly interested in what 
he saw as a critical transformation in the configuration of social relations in 
contemporary European societies. An expression accounted in particular for 
such a change, the “melting into air of the Father” (évaporation du père), which 
was crucially pronounced by Lacan in the wake of 1968 student protests (Lacan 
1969, 84). The term s’évaporer interestingly resonates, we believe, with the French 
translation of a well-known passage in Marx and Engels’s 1848 The Manifesto of the 
Communist Party: “Tout ce qui paraissait solide et fixe s’évapore” (“all that is solid 
melts into air”). This phrase is often associated with the condition of uncertainty 
that capitalist relations would produce when subjects are surrounded by things 
whose “life span” is shorter than the time required for their production (Arendt 
1959, 83). With his expression, however, Lacan identified the particular condition 
produced by what, later on, would be called the “end of the paternal dogma”; that 
is, the erosion of the transcendental function of the father (Tort 2007). According 
to Lacan, and to a number of critics contributing to this analysis in recent years, 
our epoch would bear the mark of a gradual “decline of the Oedipus, where the 
paradigmatic mode of subjectivity is no longer the subject integrated into the 
paternal Law through symbolic castration” (Žižek 2000, 248).
From a psychoanalytical perspective, a major upshot of this view is the crisis 
of desire. Once castration is suspended, ‘desire’ ceases to be a key manifestation 
of the subject of the unconscious, reflecting the birth of a new type of subject: 
the “man without gravity” (Melman 2002) or the “man without unconscious” 
(Recalcati 2010). This would coincide with a sort of “nihilistic obliteration” of the 
unconscious, resulting in two increasingly widespread tendencies: “a narcissistic 
reinforcement of the ego, producing solid identifications, which petrify sterilely 
subjective identity”; and an “urgent need to enjoy which bypasses any principle 
of symbolic mediation so as to stand as an absolute as well as deadly injunction” 
(Recalcati 2010, x). While the first outcome would entail the activation of paranoid 
strategies allowing for hypertrophic forms of identification, the second testifies 
to the emergence of a new kind of subjective construction modelled around a 
limitless as well as dissipative and monistic enjoyment.
Although never properly formalised by Lacan, the discourse of the capitalist 
integrated his theory of four discourses, accounting for a social realm organized 
around the decline of Oedipus, and therefore expressing a particular form of social 
bond no longer predicated upon the Freudian superego—where the “ideal self ” 
figures as the “custodian and guarantor of the ‘morals’ and values of society,” as 
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Lazzarato put it (Lazzarato 2012b, 95). When first referring to this new type of 
social bond in a talk in Milan in 1972, Lacan explained that while challenging 
the central function of the master discourse—which introduces prohibition, 
returning some ‘pleasure’ in exchange for the subject’s sacrifice—the capitalist 
discourse figures as a sort of modification of the latter of which it would represent 
a “substitute” (Lacan, 1978a, 49). For Lacan, the master discourse (S1 = master 
signifier), while masking the division of the subject—a split or barred subject 
($) that is cut by the experience of castration—denotes the impossibility to 
achieve totalisation. In the capitalist discourse, instead, a “little inversion” allows 
the barred subject—which in the formula of the master discourse is located in 
the position of ‘truth’ in the lower left—to assume the position of the agent (S1) 











The split subject would now control truth, enfranchising itself from the organising 
function of the Law, of the master signifier S1 (to be put, in turn, under the bar), 
and therefore indicating that the ability of the signifier to stand as a cause in the 
place of truth depends on the subject.
From a broader perspective, the crucial point to be emphasised here is 
the transition from the Weberian Beruf, which associated self-realisation with 
an ethics of labour and sacrifice, to a self-referential logic of “profit for profit’s 
sake,” which, as Stimilli put it, is independent of an extrinsic finality. An exces-
sive context modelled around the capitalist injunction to access enjoyment at 
all costs is established here, which transforms social bonds based on desire into 
objectified and consumerist relations. With a social bond no longer recognised 
through symbolic castration, the object of enjoyment replaces social relations, 
producing the transition from a Kantian imperative of sacrifice to a deadly 
compulsion to produce increasing quotas of surplus-enjoyment (plus-de-juir). 
In broad terms, the capitalist discourse requires subjects who can live their own 
enjoyment without contradiction with their ideal. With a truth now determined 
by the subject, the very possibility of castration of the discourse is negated, while 
the blockage between the object and the subject—production (a) and truth (S1) 
in the formula—is ultimately released, allowing for an ongoing circularity of 
jouissance (Cimarelli 2010).
While the master discourse masked the division of the subject, with an 
impasse between production and truth ensuring that all attempts at totalisation 
were doomed to fail, the discursive logics of capital promote an encounter with 
the object of satisfaction. Through this encounter, the subject turns towards 
knowledge (S2)—here embodied by the economic and scientific knowledge of 
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the market, which is deemed able to produce all the objects (a) that the subject 
needs for its satisfaction. The result is that a proliferation of objects (lathouses 
or gadgets) occurs, which promises the subject to satisfy its quests for happi-
ness, to suture its lack, and, unlike the master discourse, to realize its attempts 
at totalisation. Although, as we shall see, this promise is ‘untenable,’ the subject 
of this discourse lives ‘as if ’ no limits marked its condition of existence. This is 
why for Lacan, the “exploitation of desire is the great invention of the capitalist 
discourse,” its ability to “industrialise desire” (1978b, 84), a desire that, however, 
is more and more detached from the logic of castration, figuring, as we shall see 
soon, as some sort of ‘perverted’ desire.
A profoundly anti-social and narcissistic character therefore marks the 
discourse of the capitalist. Rather than connecting subjects with other subjects 
through the always problematic and paradoxical filters of desire, it connects 
subject to objects, pointing to an unending “production and consumption of 
objects of libidinal enjoyment” (Declercq 2006, 74). In a recent inspiring essay 
on the “rhetorics of contemporary capitalism,” Federico Chicchi (2012) notices 
that by fully interrogating the genealogy of the commodity in advanced capitalist 
societies, the capitalist discourse evidences a mutation in the logics of so-called 
phantom objectivity by which, in the Marxist tradition up to Lukàcs, not only rela-
tions between subjects become objectified, assuming the quality of things, but life 
itself is subjected to a violent process of encryption into mass-produced commodi-
ties. By pointing to “an anthropological translation of life tout court in a measure 
for the absolute generalisation of its own exchangeability,” advanced capitalism 
links, Chicchi notices, “the production of a reiterated surplus of subjectivity and 
cooperation to be valorised” to an all-pervasive practice of commodification. This 
relation allows consumption to stand as a
powerful and appealing assemblage of subjectification (spectral, in Derridean 
terms), aimed at constantly producing, as Foucault suggested, all the necessary 
freedom to stimulate creativity and productive invention on the one hand, 
and enjoyment and fulfilment of the economic cycle on the other.… What we 
mean to clarify with this is how the theme of production in communicative and 
biopolitical capitalism is far from losing significance in favour of consumption: 
rather, the opposite is true. Production expands its influence and procedural 
logic over every aspect of social life, including the private and often autistic 
practice of consumption. (Chicchi 2012, 15)5
In the same direction, Melinda Cooper noticed that the transition to biogenetic 
globalised capitalism fully realised the capitalist tendency to capitalise across all 
forms of life, moving from the pure consumption and commodification of “life 
as surplus” to the production and consumption of new life forms (Cooper 2008). 
Similarly, Rosi Braidotti has remarked the way in which in a system of unleashed 
consumerism, whose message is ‘disguise the limit, just do it,’ an infinite multipli-
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cation of differences is enacted. This produces all kind of goods, data, services, 
and ultimately affects also the production and “experimentation of new subject 
formations” which are now re-attached “to an overinflated notion of possessive 
individualism tied to the profit principle” (Braidotti 2013, 62); that is, disengag-
ing the very subject that was once assumed to be a factor of difference from any 
revolutionary and transformative politics and finally subsuming it.
We have seen that the very relation between the subject and the object be-
comes central in the capitalist discourse, causing the servitude of the former to the 
latter. As one considers the way in which the very nature of the object of commodity 
has changed in advanced capitalism, such a servitude assumes, therefore, the form 
of an “anthropological mutation,” as Pasolini called it (2000, 52). In this scenario, 
we have discussed already the central function that freedom has played according 
to Foucault. From a psychoanalytical perspective, the crucial point of this transi-
tion is not simply that capital becomes a successful producer and seller—among 
all other ‘objects’—of freedom: freedom to enjoy, freedom to re-invent yourself. 
What is essential here is that the rhetoric of freedom becomes the fundamental 
dynamic organising the libidinal economy of the subject in a context where the 
legitimacy for one’s power, aspirations, and achievements no longer depends on 
the external character of the law, but is more and more reliant on the subject’s 
self-control, on its capacity for self-administration and self-entrepreneurship. 
In a context where the transcendental function of the Law (the function of the 
father) no longer organises the inclusion of the subject within the programme 
of civilization, the condition of sacrifice that informs the world of the neurotic is 
replaced by the celebration of what can be called the phantasm of freedom. With 
this expression, freedom reveals its cynical, narcissistic and anti-institutional 
character: the idea that institutions and, as we mentioned earlier, even constitu-
tions are ballast, and that freedom alone can stand as a cause (Recalcati 2013).
Within this framework, neo-liberal discourse has often been criticised for 
its celebration of a “post-ideological” world realising a cosmopolitan future of 
harmony and prosperity, where social tensions can be accommodated by way 
of consensus-seeking procedures which render social conflict unnecessary and 
ideological divisions obsolete (Ranciére 2007, Mouffe 2005, Badiou 2006). Politi-
cal figures of the last twenty years—emblematically epitomised by the obscene 
Italian Prime Minister Silvio Berlusconi—have often been taken to incarnate the 
neo-liberal logics described here. They point to the anthropological mutation of an 
apology of freedom: we all are made of the same material, which is the material of 
an enjoyment no longer bounded by the restricting character of symbolic castra-
tion. This means that we are finally ‘free’ to enjoy. Servitude, from this standpoint, 
is no longer the hypnotic identification with the vertical and unifying position 
of the great ideal of the twentieth century, which was able to organize, direct and 
cement solid collectives around the figure of a master (the leader, the party, the 
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empire) that epitomised it. In a context where the leader has to be thought of 
beyond the primacy of the cause, servitude is organised horizontally through the 
compulsive relation of the consumer to its object of pleasure. In the discourse of 
the capitalist, to say that the master signifier is determined by the subject is the 
same as saying that we now live in a constellation of master signifiers, in a context 
where all causes are equal and equally meaningless.
But what happens when the object is no longer distributed in the discourse 
of the capitalist? When austerity programmes emerge that impose new limits 
to enjoyment and seem to go against the neoliberal and capitalist injunction to 
enjoy? Needless to say, the recent financial crisis seemed to challenge this long-
standing analysis. We saw that for Lazzarato this denotes the beginning of a “new 
phase” marked by an “authoritarian” turn where self-entrepreneurship is now 
transformed into the imperative to administrate one’s debts. What we suggest 
here, however, is that the illiberal dimension of austerity discourses, although 
marking a ‘turn’ in the rhetoric of neoliberalism, still expresses the very dynamics 
of the discourse of the capitalist and the phantasm of freedom that sustains it. 
This turn, rather than a rupture, denotes a shift in the rhetoric of freedom, with 
a downplaying of its usual play on liberal attitudes, success, prosperity and credit 
in favour of other elements that were once thrust aside (or ‘outside’ the cultural 
borders of Europe) and that are now intensified—namely, illiberal practices, 
failure, poverty and debt.
In his 1972 talk in Milan, Lacan noticed that the discourse of the capitalist 
exhibits an “open” crisis. For Lacan, this critical condition does not indicate, 
however, that this discourse has become “enfeebled” (ce soit moche), as in fact it 
reveals itself to be “wildly astute” (follement astucieux), the “most astute discourse 
that we have made” (Lacan 1978a, 36).6 Its critical condition is rather to be under-
stood as a quality of its being “untenable” (intenable), untenable up to the point 
of a “blowout” (crevaison). The capitalist discourse in other words, could not be 
better, but precisely because of this, it gets worse and worse; as Lacan put it: “it 
goes on casters (ça marche comme sur des roulettes), it could not run better, but 
in fact it goes so fast that it consumes itself, it consumes itself so much that it gets 
consummated [that eventually it burns out]” (ça se consomme, ça se consomme si 
bien que ça se consume). In psycho-social terms, this logic can be connected to the 
so-called “clinics of new symptoms,” denoting the “new” pandemic proliferation 
of a number of symptoms, e.g., anorexia, bulimia, addictions, which manifest 
the very deadly character of the superego injunction to enjoy that the capitalist 
discourse instantiates in the time of the melting into air of the father (Recalcati 
2010). The more you eat, drink, consume and enjoy—whether it is drugs, gad-
gets, pornographic materials, and so on—the emptier you get in a compulsive 
circularity between the subject and the object, which denotes the transition from 
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the subject of lack—lack as the productive dynamics instantiating the desire of 
the other, the very dialectics of desire—to a subject of emptiness (Recalcati 2002).
We believe, however, that the very astute character of the capitalist discourse 
lies in the implicit reversal of this logic whereby an inversion of these terms 
is made possible, which ‘turns’ the sequence of the capitalist discourse upside 
down, allowing it to go so fast that it consummates itself [that it burns itself out]; 
it consummates itself so much that it gets consumed. What we have here, therefore, 
is a structural and astute circularity informing the logic of consumption, where 
the failure of the system (consummation) is what allows the system to work as a 
consuming machine, to capitalise upon its own failure, producing and consuming 
it too. It is in this perspective that debt and failure reveal all their structural con-
tiguity with the logics of credit and success that informed the liberal articulation 
of the phantasm of freedom. Lazzarato’s transition from the liberal “work on the 
self ”—with its invitation to be the manager of your own success—to the illiberal 
“imperative to take on the risks and costs that neither business nor the State are 
willing to undertake”—that is, to be the manager of your own failures—would 
rather express here the coextensive presence of the two structural sides of the 
phantasm of freedom in which the il-liberal turn is knotted. The production and 
consumption of success and satisfaction are consubstantial in the discourse of 
the capitalist with the production and consumption of both failure and empti-
ness. It is in this sense that, rather than standing as the sign of a rupture in the 
neoliberal celebration of freedom, or the ‘return’ of some sort of modern paradigm 
of sacrifice and prohibition, debt and failure fully realise, as we put it earlier, that 
very mode of government that Foucault delineated in his analysis of liberalism.
According to French psychoanalyst Charles Melman, the psycho-social para-
digm organising our contemporary epoch around what has been described here 
as the discourse of the capitalist could be described in terms of a generalised 
perversion (Melman 2002).7 Roughly, in Lacanian psychoanalysis perversion 
denotes a structural position in which the subject veils the symbolic experience 
of castration through disavowal (e.g., I know it happened, but I carry on as if it 
hadn’t). In the case of fetishism, for instance, perversion fixes the subject to an 
object of libidinal investment, which allows the staging of a scene preceding 
the experience of castration, separation and loss. From the point of view of the 
drive, perversion is the structure in which the organisation of the drive is best 
revealed, denoting the subject’s attempt to pursue “jouissance as far as possible” 
(Lacan 2006b, 700). Jouissance (in English ‘enjoyment’) figures here as a “painful 
pleasure” that is always excessive for the physical survival of the subject (Lacan 
1992, 184). In this respect, perversion reflects the attempt of the subject to go 
beyond the pleasure principle, the Freudian homeostatic limit imposed on bodily 
pleasure in order for it to be bearable to the subject. The expression ‘generalised 
perversion’ denotes therefore the ability of the discourse of the capitalist to invite 
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subjects-consumers to pursue jouissance as far as possible, promoting a certain 
transgression of the pleasure principle with its limits and norms, as exemplarily 
celebrated in a recent BMW billboard Le Plaisir n’a pas de limite (Pleasure has 
no limits). If Melman’s reference to perversion fully adapts to an old context 
dominated by the neo-liberal celebration of credit and prosperity, we believe that 
this clinical figure can also help understand the kind of libidinal economy that 
the debt economy instantiates, revealing the way in which anxiety interacts with 
lack, jouissance and castration in times of austerity.
In Freudian psychoanalysis, while anxiety was initially seen as the effect of 
an inadequate discharge of “physical sexual tension” arising out of libido (Freud 
1966, 191), it became, in later theories, an affective state situated at the level of the 
ego and resulting from the perception of a threat (Freud 1959). Besides linking 
the nature of this threat to the possibility of organic injury, however, Freud also 
connected it to the overwhelming dimension of the event, to what Lacan would 
later define in terms of the real. With this term Lacan referred to the excessive 
character of the event, pointing to the impossibility to fully symbolise and codify 
empirical reality. In this respect, anxiety emerges in association with a situa-
tion that is or can be traumatic and uncodable—such as the loss of the mother 
(‘separation anxiety’), loss of love, object-loss, castration, etc. It is an effect—or 
the anticipation of an effect—of an encounter with the uncoded, an experience 
of trauma and castration that cannot be symbolised.
In addition, Lacan also considers anxiety as a condition emerging when lack 
itself fails to appear, when “the lack happens to be lacking” (quand le manqué 
vient à manquer) (Lacan 2014, 42). If translated into the Oedipal scene, anxiety 
here would not result from loss and separation, but would be an effect of the 
very proximity with the incestuous object. In this context, anxiety results from 
a full access to jouissance, which would obstruct or veil the emergence of lack. 
This means that the subject would experience the condition that occurs when 
lack happens to be lacking, a condition of absence of norms, prohibitions and 
limits to jouissance, a deadly proximity to the object of satisfaction that would 
‘consummate’ the subject when the object is ‘consumed’:
I’ll simply point out to you that a good many things may arise in the sense of 
anomalies, but that’s not what provokes anxiety in us. But should all the norms, 
that is, that which makes for anomaly just as much as that which makes for 
lack, happen all of a sudden not to be lacking, that’s when the anxiety starts. 
(Lacan 2014, 42)
It is precisely because of the complex dynamics of anxiety, as an effect of both 
separation and loss on the one hand, and proximity and lack of limits on the other, 
that Lacan can state that: “anxiety is very precisely the meeting point where all 
my previous discourse awaits you” (Lacan 2014, 3). It is here that we can trace 
the perverse character of the discourse of the capitalist, where the saturation of 
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lack produced by the proliferation of libidinal objects makes the very anxiety of 
the subject vibrate, an anxiety that consummates the subject at the very moment 
it consumes its object of satisfaction.
This consummation, however, is itself an object of consumption. The con-
summation of the other is an effect of the instrumental character of jouissance 
in the discourse of the capitalist. The ability of a system marked by the capitalist 
discourse to rouse the anxiety of the subject can also be seen, in fact, in terms 
of the instrumental logic informing perverse desire. In subcategories of perver-
sion such as sadism and masochism, for instance, the subject locates itself as 
the object of the invocatory drive, becoming the powerful “instrument of the 
Other’s jouissance” (Lacan 2006b, 700). By assuming the position of the object-
instrument of the ‘will-to-enjoy’ (volonté-de jouissance), a perverse position finds 
its possibility for jouissance reliant on the jouissance of the Other, working and 
directing its activity to achieve this objective. In allowing the other a certain ac-
cess to jouissance, however, the power to provoke the experience of anxiety is also 
constituted. While the very proximity to jouissance by the other remains somehow 
an excessive experience, this proximity is irremediably dependent on the whims 
of the pervert who acts as its means, and who might in fact tend to enact a play 
of presence and absence of this access, offer and subtraction of jouissance, sup-
port for its access and blackmail as soon as this access is realised. What we have 
is then an ultimate transferral of the very experience of castration to the field of 
the other. As Lacan put it: “the anxiety of the other, his essential existence as a 
subject in relation to this anxiety, this is precisely the string that sadistic desire 
means to pluck” (Lacan 2014, 104). By stirring the anxiety of the other through an 
encounter with jouissance, hence consummating the other through a transposal 
of castration, a certain consumption of libidinal economy is also secured for the 
pervert and ultimately realised.
A fundamental link between jouissance and anxiety, excitement and black-
mail, consumption and consummation characterises therefore the perverse 
framework here delineated. Renata Salecl (2004) has examined the dangerous 
allure that the pervert exerts over the other, accounting for the destabilising 
encounter of pleasure (for instance, sexual pleasures, freedom of choice and 
consuming the object of satisfaction, etc.) and fear (AIDS, Anthrax attacks in 
the 1990s, ‘guilt’ when the very possibility to enjoy is prevented) across several 
“ages of anxiety” intensifying in the period between the 1990s and the recent 
war on terror. We believe that this link finds expression, more recently, in those 
elements of corruption and generalised blackmail that Lazzarato, for instance, 
considers to be “consubstantial with the neoliberal model” (Lazzarato 2012a, 14), 
but which appear also as the structural effects of that very regime of freedom that 
Foucault himself detected. It is within this perverse scenario that, for instance, 
we interpret the anti-social function of the so-called precariat. This stands as a 
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new form of proletariat trapped in the pervasive logic of blackmail qua condition 
for excitement: hence, neo-liberal labour policies murmuring, from a perverse 
standpoint: if you wish to work, to enjoy the benefits of work, then you need to 
accept your exposure to uncertainty, precarity and lack of rights, even at the cost 
of exploitation.
While the economic convenience of the recent proliferation of temporary jobs, 
mini-jobs, precarious jobs in Europe is questionable (minor labour costs are often 
accompanied by minor productivity in terms of motivation and qualification of 
the working poor), the disciplinary effects are clear, contributing to enhance the 
level of uncertainty and blackmailing of society as a whole. It is, again, within 
this framework that we also read the rhetorical force of those thermometers or 
gauges that in the last years have measured the level of threat and danger, and 
whose use, however, has functioned to increase uncertainty and anxiety. We think, 
for instance, about the way in which national terrorist alert scales were devised 
during the ‘war on terror,’ using the colours of the traffic light to signal the level of 
imminent danger, with the result, of course, that colours changed so quickly and 
unreasonably, even several times per day, that paralysis was produced as result, 
with people ultimately unable to rate their condition of safety and inclined, in 
conditions of anxiety, to accept heavy restrictions on civil rights. As Jackson put 
it: “the language of threat and danger was not inevitable or simply a neutral or 
objective evaluation of the threat. Rather, it was the deliberative and systematic 
construction of a social climate of fear” (Jackson 2005, 120).
The same rhetorical function played out in the US by the term al-Qaeda in 
those years, with its related indices of danger, has been played out recently by the 
term spread. While credit spread denotes the difference in yield between differ-
ent securities, in countries like Italy and Greece spread began to be used in the 
media in the aftermath of the 2008 financial crisis to indicate a similar difference 
between national and German bonds (the most stable at the time), with a higher 
rate signalling higher interests to be paid by the state. In Italy, the term soon came 
to symbolise the proximity to national bankruptcy, with a limit of 6 percent dif-
ference between Italian ten-year bonds and the German benchmark sanctioning 
the so-called point of no return. While becoming headline news on television, 
accompanying the lives of millions of people every day at that time, the level of 
spread soon began to take thrilling roller coaster turns with schizophrenic oscilla-
tions reaching the ‘unsustainable’ quote 574 in 2011. This ultimately ‘necessitated’ 
the unelected Mario Monti to take over the position of prime minister from Silvio 
Berlusconi and implementing neoliberal reforms in the labour market and on 
pension schemes on the grounds of an ‘emergency logic’ once again dominated 
by an economy of anxiety. While this logic still operates in Italy, with the new 
‘un-elected’ prime minister Matteo Renzi ‘assuming the responsibility’ to face a 
situation of emergency and govern, the limit of spread signalling the point of no 
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return changed several times in a scale between 6 percent and 7 percent—evi-
dence of the inconsistency and arbitrariness of the parameter. Observers coined 
the expressions spread anxiety and dictatorship of the spread (Scotti 2012, Somma 
2014), noticing the extreme instability of this key gauge of market confidence in 
Italy’s ability to repay its massive debt. Needless to say, the use of this index has 
so far been accompanied by everyday analyses concerning the condition of the 
Italian economy at large, which were contradictory in the way they changed from 
one day to another with slogans such as ‘the crisis is over’ immediately followed 
by ‘Italy on the edge of bankruptcy.’ It became reminiscent of the Orwellian lack 
of memory in Nineteen Eighty-Four, when, in the face of ongoing alerts, nobody 
could remember that today’s allies had been enemies only a day before.
It is in this complex context of jouissance and anxiety, excitement and 
blackmail that the logic of credit and the logic of debit disclose their structural 
contiguity, manifesting the contradictory nature of capital as an unrelenting 
producer of codes. Capitalism reveals here its axiomatic nature, dominated by 
“abundance” in conjunction with “scarcity,” as Deleuze put it in his lessons preced-
ing the publication of Anti-Oedipus: it figures as “an axiomatic with a limit that 
cannot be saturated” so that when it encounters something new which it does 
not recognize “it is always ready to add one more axiom to restore its function-
ing” (Deleuze 1971). It is here that the logic of an abundance of capital intersects 
with the logic of scarcity and austerity in a terrain where “semiotics of guilt” and 
“semiotics of innocence” overlap (Lazzarato 2012a, 7). Hence, the impersonal 
voice of a fluctuating ‘market’ emerges whispering: you should enjoy and live in 
harmony with your credit. But if you do, be ready for the failing effects of this 
enjoyment, your condition of indebtedness! Or, conversely: you should abstain 
from enjoyment in times of austerity, yet, shame on you if you do abstain, as you 
are not helping your economy! In this respect, the il-liberal nexus sustaining the 
phantasm of freedom of the capitalist discourse appears to be marking not so 
much the erupting emergence of a debt economy opening a new phase, but the 
critical and complex processuality of an economy of anxiety in a context where 
old and new codes coexist, guilt and innocence overlap, and the subject is sus-
pended in the uncodable terrain of a contradictory circularity between success 
and failure, satisfaction and emptiness, limitless credit and limitless debt. In 
the face of this uncodable terrain where conflicting codes overlay one another, 
where the neo-liberal emphasis on self-entrepreneurship is contrasted with the 
inability to properly manage the all-pervasive dimension of indebtedness with its 
phantasmatic deferrals and quantifications, and where the subject’s self-control 
and capacity for self-administration is contrasted by the very capitalisation on 
failure that neo-liberal policies sustain, anxiety emerges as the inevitable condi-
tion of a real encounter with the uncoded.
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In stressing the disciplinary dimension of this phantasmatic scenario, Yan-
nis Stavrakakis argues that “the current management of the crisis involves a 
continuous dialectic between subjectivity and the social bond using well-tested 
technologies of domination that manage to sublimate what appears as ambiva-
lence and contradiction (encouraged accumulation of debt and punishment), 
even breakthrough (debt cancellation), into mutual engagement sustaining the 
dominant power block” (Stavrakakis 2013, 37). It is here that ‘success’ and ‘failure,’ 
‘consumption’ and ‘consummation’ display their full biopolitical potential enacting 
a circular motion of care, shame, discipline of affects, and punishment which is 
both prospective and retroactive:
We have discussed a process of creating and sustaining shame and guilt and 
thus legitimizing punishment—but what if it is also the other way round? … 
The biopolitical performativity of the punishment itself retroactively ascribes 
to past behavior the stigma of an excessive, immoral, irrational, pathology. 
Here, punishment seems to retroactively produce guilt and shame, almost 
bypassing blame. This is a sinister occurrence, with serious implications for 
the way we characterize the course of (post-)democratic politics in countries 
of the European periphery. (Stavrakakis 2013, 37)
The new austerity model expressed by the il-liberal turn pivots on an astute 
intersecting of outbursts of renunciation, irreducible circularity of guilt and 
satisfaction, and persistent attachment to a dissipative enjoyment. It is intensi-
fied by a normative insistence on details, infinite procedures, assessments and 
self-assessments, bureaucratic forms to be filled out, nit-pickings, practices of 
exceptions, which elevates the production of success up to the point of a produc-
tion of failure along the new principle regulating academic labour “Evaluate and 
Punish” (Pinto 2012). Far from re-establishing the experience of the limit that 
symbolic law should guarantee (a limit which is also an experience of separa-
tion between selfhood and otherness, the subject and its object of love), a new 
perverse disavowal is expressed in the form of austerity. Here, this final salvation 
and satisfaction of debt become more and more unreachable and evanescent, 
testifying to a perennial deferral of the criteria and limits that presides over the 
re-payment of debt. Moreover, the perverse instance that is deemed to ‘absolve’ 
debt, or loosen the obligation of debt, is located in the grey threshold of indis-
tinction between the inside and the outside of the community (in the form, for 
example, of unelected governments in Greece, Italy or impersonal ‘entities’ such 
as ‘the market,’ the ‘troika,’ Europe, etc.). The result is that austerity is no longer 
aimed at re-establishing the sacrifice of the whole community upon which, for 
instance, post–World War II Europe was modelled, reflecting a society that had 
been harmonised and levelled by the common experience of loss (the historical 
case of austerity policies in post-war period). But the very possibility of a settling 
and repayment is indefinably accompanied with the perverse blackmail by which 
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enjoyment is only possible for the other (the community) by way of an act of as-
sumption and consumption of anxiety. A particular form of libidinal economy is 
promoted and sustained by the capitalist discourse in times of austerity, which 
is rooted in the typical transferral of a certain kind of sadistic perversion by 
which the symbolic experience of castration is turned over to the other, and an 
inassimilable core of anguish (anxiety) is passed on, as Lacan would say, in the 
imperturbable and “soulless” location of God (Lacan 2014, 164): the soulless and 
irresponsible citizen now remodelled, through an unsolvable knot, in the figure of 
the indebted citizen, responsible in the end for a new soul to be provoked, blamed, 
cared for, and disciplined.
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Notes
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1. All translations from this text are made by the author.
2. Friedrich August von Hayek has been one of the most influential economists of 
twentieth-century liberal theory, marking the later experience of the Ordoliberal 
school in Freiburg while also contributing to US neo-liberal reflections with his 
previous teaching at the University of Chicago.
3. All translations from this text (2012a) are made by the author.
4. Translated by the author.
5. Translated by the author.
6. All translations from this text are made by the author.
7. Unlike Melman and others, we do not take perversion to reveal the paradigmatic 
form of social bond of our “epoch” in general, nor do we believe that perversion can 
be assumed as the inner logic of capital as such. Our reference to perversion rather 
highlights the specific form of libidinal economy that informs the discourse of the 
capitalist under the guise of neo-liberal discourses, discourses that furthermore 
compete with other discursive formations organised around different logics “within” 
our contemporary epoch.
BiBliography
Arendt, Hannah. 1959. The Human Condition. New York: Doubleday.
Badiou, Alain. 2006. Metapolitics. London: Verso.
Balibar, Étienne. 2011. “Europe’s Revolution from Above,” The Guardian (November 23).
The Discourse of the Capitalist in Times of Austerity 173
Balibar, Étienne. 2013. “Debt Capitalism.” London: London Graduate School (Oral: 
Symposium; available at http://backdoorbroadcasting.net/2013/03/debt-a-half-
day-symposium/).
Braidotti, Rosi. 2013. The Posthuman. Cambridge: Polity Press.
Chicchi, Federico. 2012. Soggettività smarrita—Sulle retoriche del capitalism contempo-
raneo. Milano: Bruno Mondadori.
Cimarelli, Silvia. 2010. “Una lettura introduttiva ai quattro discorsi di Lacan,” Attualità 
Lacaniana, n. 11: 147–84.
Cooper, Melinda. 2008. Life as Surplus: Biotechnology and Capitalism in the Neoliberal Era. 
Seattle: University of Washington Press.
Declercq, Frédéric. 2006. “Lacan on the Capitalist Discourse: Its Consequences for Libidinal 
Enjoyment and Social Bonds,” Psychoanalysis, Culture & Society 11: 74–83.
http://dx.doi.org/10.1057/palgrave.pcs.2100068
Deleuze, Gilles. 1971. “Cours Vincennes - 16/11/1971: Capitalism, flows, the decoding of 
flows,” www.webdeleuze.com, available at http://www.webdeleuze.com/php/texte.
php?cle=116&groupe=Anti%20Oedipe%20et%20Mille%20Plateaux&langue=2
Foucault, Michel. (1979) 2008. The Birth of Biopolitics: Lectures at the Collège de France 
1978–79. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.
http://dx.doi.org/10.1057/9780230594180
Freud, Sigmund. (1926) 1959. “Inhibitions, Symptoms and Anxiety.” Volume 20 of The Stan-
dard Edition of the Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud. London: Hogarth.
Freud, Sigmund. (1937) 1964. “Analysis Terminable and Interminable.” Volume 23 of The 
Standard Edition of the Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud. London: 
Hogarth.
Freud, Sigmund. (1894) 1966. “Draft E. How Anxiety Originates: Extracts from the Fliess 
Papers.” Volume 1 of The Standard Edition of the Complete Psychological Works of 
Sigmund Freud. London: Hogarth.
Graeber, David. 2011. Debt: The First 5,000 Years. London: Melville House.
Gramsci, Antonio. (1933) 2001. “Q 15 (II) § 5, Passato e presente. La crisi,” I Quaderni dal 
Carcere, Volume Terzo. Torino: Einaudi (Prison Notebooks).
Hayek, Friedrich August von. (1979) 1981. Law, Legislation and Liberty, Volume 3: The 
Political Order of a Free People. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Jackson, Richard. 2005. Writing the War on Terrorism: Language, Politics and Counter-
Terrorism. Manchester: Manchester University Press.
Lacan, Jacques. (1968) 1969. “Intervention sur l’exposé de M. de Certeau: ‘Ce que Freud fait 
de l’histoire. Note à propos de: ‘Une névrose démoniaque au XVIIe siècle,’’ Congrès 
de Strasbourg, le 12 octobre 1968,” Lettres de L’école Freudienne 7.
Lacan, Jacques. (1972) 1978a. “Del discorso psicoanalitico.” In Lacan in Italia, 1953–1978. 
En Italie Lacan, 27–39. Milan: La Salmandra.
Lacan, Jacques. (1973) 1978b. “Excursus.” In Lacan in Italia, 1953–1978. En Italie Lacan, 
74–84. Milan: La Salmandra.
Lacan, Jacques. (1959–1960) 1992. The Seminar Book VII, The Ethics of Psychoanalysis, 
1959–1960/1992. London: Routledge.
174 Andrea Mura
Lacan, Jacques. (1969–1970) 2006a. The Seminar. Book XVII, The Other Side of Psycho-
analysis, 1969–1970. New York: Norton.
Lacan, Jacques. (1960) 2006b. “The Subversion of the Subject and the Dialectic of Desire in 
the Freudian Unconscious.” In Écrits: The First Complete Edition in English, 671–702. 
New York: W. W. Norton & Company.
Lacan, Jacques. (1962–1963) 2014. Anxiety: The Seminar of Jacques Lacan, Book X. Cam-
bridge: Polity Press.
Lazzarato, Maurizio. 2012a. “The Authoritarian Turn of Neoliberalism—Preface to the 
Italian Edition.” In La Fabbrica dell’Uomo Indebitato, 5–27. Roma: DetriveApprodi.
Lazzarato, Maurizio. 2012b. The Making of the Indebted Man: Essay on the Neoliberal 
Condition. Los Angeles: Semiotext(e).
Melman, Charles. 2002. L’homme sans gravité: Jouir à tout prix. Paris: Denoël.
Mouffe, Chantal. 2005. On the Political. London: Routledge.
Pasolini, Pier Paolo. (1974) 2000. “Gli Italiani non sono più quelli,” Scritti corsari. Milano: 
Garzanti.
Pinto, Valeria. 2012. Valutare e Punire. Napoli: Cronopio.
Ranciére, Jacques. 2007. On the Shores of Politics. London: Verso.
Recalcati, Massimo. 2002. Clinica del vuoto. Anoressie, dipendenze, psicosi. Milano: Fran-
coAngeli.
Recalcati, Massimo. 2010. L’uomo senza inconscio. Milano: Raffaello Cortina Editore.
Recalcati, Massimo. 2013. “Da Freud al Cavaliere: il fantasma populista.” La Repubblica 
(February 22).
Salecl, Renata. 2004. On Anxiety. Abingdon, Oxon: Routledge.
Scotti, Marco. 2012. “Un anno di spread: le montagne russe dell’economia,” affaritaliani.it, 
(December 3), http://www.affaritaliani.it/fattieconti/un-anno-di-spread031212.html.
Somma, Alessandro. 2014. La dittatura dello spread: Germania, Europa e crisi del debito. 
Roma: DeriveApprodi.
Stavrakakis, Yannis. 2013. “Debt Society: Greece and the Future of Post-Democracy,” Radi-
cal Philosophy 181 (September/October): 33–38.
Stimilli, Elettra. 2011. Il Debito del Vivente. Macerata: Quodlibet.
Tort, Michel. 2007. La fin du dogme paternel. Paris: Flammarion.
Žižek, Slavoj. 2000. The Ticklish Subject: The Absent Centre of Political Ontology. London: 
Verso.
